

The United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden and the United Kingdom of the Netherlands 1814–1830: Comparative Perspectives on Politics of Amalgamation and Nation Building

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Abstract

This article discusses the politics of unification and consequential national reactions in two union states established in a transitional period in European history: the United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden, a loose personal union from 1814, and the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, uniting the Northern and Southern Netherlands in a unitary state in 1815. Both state constructions were constitutional monarchies, led by ambitious rulers – Charles XIV John and William I. They had different means available for securing and strengthening their reorganized states; both applied a sort of politics of amalgamation in order to blend the two different national groups, in spite of the accepted status of the two groups as equal parts of the new state. This policy triggered national-based reactions on behalf of the non-dominant partner. This article will compare different aspects of the unification and state-building processes in these two regions, such as naming, mapping and cultivation of culture, which took place in the public sphere.

Keywords

union states, national identities, state building, naming, maps, regions

Reconfigurations of statehoods usually lead to renewed names, revised maps, and reformulated political, historical and geographical narratives. Such reorganization of states in the age of romantic nationalism highlights the emerging awareness of cultural and national identities, demonstrating that cultural nationalism is intrinsically part of all kinds of nationalism, at least in its incipience (Leerseen 2006: 11; Leerseen 2018: 18-43). State-building processes in restructured union states with unifying ambitions in the nineteenth century thus seem to have the effect of triggering national reactions and resistance – particularly on behalf of the non-dominant partner.

The aim of this article is to discuss politics of unification and ‘official’ patriotism – or ‘amalgamation’ to use one of the contemporary terms – in the age of romantic nationalism, by comparing two reorganized state structures in post-Napoleonic Europe: the United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden, and the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, established at the same time, during the transitional years in a European context, 1813-1815.¹

The interesting parallels, in spite of several obvious differences between these two entities, makes this a relevant case for a comparative approach. The comparison demonstrates the role of culturally and nationally based tensions in new state constructions, and illustrates reactions that may come to the fore when national diversities are neglected or not recognized, and an amalgamation policy is applied. If one compares two contemporary examples of restructured states established in order to unite two peoples, although based on the principle of two equal partners, common features may be distinguished and new insights gained that would not be apparent from studying each state in national isolation.

A main difference between these two kingdoms lies in the political organization itself: the two Scandinavian countries were united in a loose personal union – the United Kingdoms – in the plural – of Norway and Sweden, established in 1814. The United Kingdom – in the singular – of the Netherlands was a single, unitary state, established in 1815. Both states consisted however of two main parts – and were based on the acceptance of two *equal* parts: Norway and Sweden in the Scandinavian Peninsula, and the Northern and Southern (former

Austrian) parts of the Netherlands, respectively. A striking parallel to be discussed in this article is the efforts to blend the two separate national groups, known in both regions as the policy of unification or amalgamation (Hemstad 2018: 122, Kossmann 1978: 110).

The new international context and transformed geopolitical map after the Napoleonic Wars was an aspect of importance for both regions, with Russia as a potentially threatening neighbour in the northeastern hemisphere, the German lands and France as relevant 'others' and dominant Great Powers in the neighbourhood of the Netherlands. Both regions had a role to play as buffer states, as bulwarks against French or Russian expansion. Another geopolitical aspect was the huge Dutch colonial Empire, which had no similar counterpart in the Swedish-Norwegian case. The role of religion also differed profoundly, the Netherlands being a multifaith-state with Protestantism, Catholicism and Judaism, while Norway and Sweden were predominantly Protestant states. Still there are several traits characterising these political units, which make a comparative approach worthwhile, not least when it comes to the question of the politics of amalgamation and national identities.

The revived image of the newly-established state had to be communicated to the inhabitants, in the public sphere, not least through publications, cultural efforts and the school system. These images and narratives also had to be acknowledged and appropriated by the population. These are certainly not simple and uncontroversial processes, backed by the support of all the inhabitants in question – especially not when the aim is to merge different national groups. These processes were, one may say, countered by another strong tendency at the time, namely the cultivation of national culture, or 'cultural consciousness-raising' (Leerseen 2005: 11; Leerseen 2018: 23). By comparing the development in these two regions, the Scandinavian and the Dutch, I hope to shed some light on these intertwined processes – state building through amalgamation from above and culturally based national reactions from below. So far – as far as I know – there has been no comparative study of these two united kingdoms at the beginning of the nineteenth century, although

there are some comparative and transnational analyses looking at the Netherlands and Denmark(-Norway).²

The acknowledgement of different national identities and sentiments is probably of major importance for the success and longevity of united kingdoms, not least in Restoration Europe, as Alvin Jackson reminds us (see his contribution in this issue). In his seminal book on *The Two Unions*, Jackson discusses why the union between Great Britain and Ireland failed: 'The Irish union failed because it could neither permanently accommodate nor defuse a distinctive Irish national sentiment' (Jackson 2012: 356). The union with Scotland, on the other hand, has survived so far because it has 'in fact, been able to contain and represent much Scottish national feeling' (Jackson 2012: 357).

Each historical union state is a unique balance between the involved partners. Union states in the nineteenth-century age of nationalism had to be more cautious regarding the role of culture and national identities. The ambiguous role of state institutions in this contentious field is illuminated in the case of the Dutch and the Scandinavian union states.

The map of Scandinavia, like that of the Netherlands, had to be re-drawn – literally and politically – after the events in 1814–1815. This, however, did not mean that the existing historically and culturally based mental maps were easily reconfigured or that the outcome was given. The Benelux-area and the Nordic countries of today may be termed macroregions, encompassing more than one traditionally or politically defined region or country with some sort of similarity within a geopolitically determined area. Today's nation-states within these macroregions – Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland – were the outcome of long-term processes of state building and nation building, but they were not necessarily the only possible outcome, even if they are commonly viewed as the only possible reflection of a correspondence between the state and its constituent nation. There were, in fact, different possible options of self-identification and, using Joep Leerssen's words, in studying national processes we have to 'take into account the roads not taken, the ideals that were not realized', if we are to understand nationalism (Leerssen 2006: 17).

The United Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden ended up as 'roads not taken'. The former failed after only 15 years, in 1830, when the Belgians decided to form their own kingdom. The looser Scandinavian counterpart went on for 91 years and split up in 1905 due to Norwegian initiatives. Seen from the perspective of the agents at the time, the future was open-ended, not pre-determined, as both Stråth and Leerssen underline (Stråth 2005; Leerssen 2006: 17). Studying roads not taken as possible options at the time will contribute to complicating an otherwise potentially anachronistic picture. The United Kingdom context – Netherlandic or Scandinavian – was important at the time and influenced and informed contemporary society. Such influences tend to be neglected or underestimated in a historiography predominantly defined by a national narrative.

In both regions, different national allegiances were competing for predominance, although in different ways. What Leerseen calls the 'rivalry and mutual counterpositioning of different national groups' based on different appropriations of the past, may be observed in both state constructions (Leerseen 2013: 114). This was, however, a rivalry without violence. It was a fight going on not least in the public sphere. In both regions there were several attempts to create a sense of common identity. Some of these were initiatives from above due to the restructured states. In the Scandinavian region, there was also a transnational movement from below, the pan-Scandinavian movement from the late 1830s, guided by national aspirations on behalf of the 'greater' Scandinavian macroregion: Norway, Sweden and Denmark.³ This sort of movement is not paralleled in the Benelux region until the Greater Netherlandic movement of the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. There are probably also interesting parallels between the Scandinavian personal union and the Dutch political (until 1839) and later personal union (until 1890) with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the third main part of the reorganized Netherlandic state of 1815.⁴ The comparative analysis presented in this article will, however, concentrate on the early phase of the union in the Scandinavian Peninsula, coinciding with the Dutch experience of macroregional unification. Aspects of special interest to be dealt

with, after a short historical introduction on the unification process of both kingdoms, are the issue of amalgamation and the question of naming and mapping, along with some reflections on the cultivation of national culture.

Unification

The starting point for the two state constructions under consideration is the last phase of the Napoleonic Wars. The Great Powers gathered at the Congress of Vienna 1814–1815 played an important role in these in the attempt to secure a peaceful solution in the north and northwestern part of Europe. There are interesting parallels between the Scandinavian and the Dutch cases already at this early stage. In both cases, the main actor ultimately responsible for the union, namely Crown Prince Charles John (1763–1844), and Prince William Frederik (1772–1843), representing Sweden and the Netherlands, took centre stage, cleverly using the window of opportunity caused by the wars. Even though Swedish and Dutch influence in Europe had been profoundly reduced since the eighteenth century, both countries were among the winners after the Napoleonic Wars.

In his influential book on the Congress of Vienna Webster states that after the Napoleonic Wars Sweden, under the leadership of Crown Prince Charles John, became ‘in a sense the only power which had been granted a specific extension of territory that satisfied its expectations’ (Webster 1963: 9). Something similar might be said of the Prince of Orange, William Frederik, later William I, son of Wilhelm V, the last Stadtholder of the Dutch Republic, who died in exile. The allied wars against Napoleon – culminating at Waterloo in Southern Netherlands in 1815 – secured renewed independence for both the Northern and the Southern Netherlands, and an opportunity for unification. On 21 June 1814 the Great Powers signed the Eight Articles in London, securing the Dutch crown for the House of Orange. Soon thereafter, on 16 March 1815, William I assumed the title of king, and on 21 September 1815 he was inaugurated as King of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (Lok 2017: 40). As observed by Blom and Lamberts, the Dutch unification, ‘was certainly made without consulting the people

of the South, but northerners, too, barely had a say in the matter' (Blom and Lamberts 2006: 305).

The Norwegian people were originally not consulted by the Swedish Crown Prince, the former French Marshal Bernadotte, either, and the Swedish people too, barely had a say in the matter. The Kingdom of Norway, a subordinated part of a dual monarchy with Denmark since the late fourteenth century, was to serve as a compensation for the Swedish loss of Finland in 1809 as well as a reward for Swedish participation in the concluding wars against Napoleon. In this scheme, Bernadotte – like his Dutch counterpart – got support from the Great Powers, especially Britain, which played the major role in the international diplomacy at the time. In 1814 Norway was handed over from the King of Denmark to the King of Sweden like a 'herd of cattle' through the Treaty of Kiel of 14 January 1814 (Hemstad 2014: 13–91). Due to firm Norwegian resistance against Swedish policy, however, Norway managed to secure for itself an autonomous position within the union, based on its own constitution, written while Bernadotte was still occupied with the war on the continent. At the same time, the Danish Crown Prince, Christian Frederik (1786–1848), Stadtholder in Norway since 1813, was elected King of Norway. The new king had to abdicate during the autumn, and the Constitution, signed on 17 May, had to be adjusted later that year, as Bernadotte returned with the Swedish army and attacked Norway, but soon accepted the Constitution with minor revisions. In his propaganda campaign, launched as early as 1812 and directed at both the Norwegian population and an international audience, he had, after all, promised to give Norway its own constitution.⁵

On 4 November 1814 the King of Sweden was elected King of Norway by the Norwegian Parliament. By this act, and an Act of Union confirmed by both parliaments in 1815, Norway and Sweden were joined in a personal union. The Royal House, and the foreign policy, at this time a royal prerogative, were the main common institutions within the union (Berg 2014: 265–286). The two united parties maintained, on the other hand, their own constitution, government and parliament, as well as separate legal, economic and cultural systems. The Dual Kingdoms also had two capitals, namely Christiania (Oslo) and Stockholm, and the Norwegian government was divided between the two cities in order

to be closer to the Stockholm-based king. The two capital system was to some extent mirrored in the Dutch case, where the government and administration resided alternately in Den Haag and Brussels, changing every year.

Both the restructured Scandinavian and Dutch kingdoms were constitutional monarchies, even if the constitutional arrangements differed. The Dutch Constitution of 1814, also promised by the first king of the union, William I, was revised in order to include the Southern Netherlands some months later, in 1815 (Deseure and Smit 2018: 98–121). Freedom of the press was secured in the constitutions of both regions, but the political cultures and the symbolic role of the constitution varied. In the Netherlands, the constitution did not play an important national and symbolic role, and the population – more in the North than in the South – was therefore in general quite indifferent towards it during the first years (van Zanten 2012: 458–459). In Sweden, the 1809 Constitution did not play a significant national and symbolic role among the population either. In Norway, on the other hand, with the symbolic and political value the Constitution contributed to securing Norwegian autonomy and 17 May, Constitution Day, was celebrated already from 1824.

The lack of public enthusiasm for the new constitution in the Netherlands may be partly explained by the fact that, as Aerts claims, the restoration order in the Netherlands ‘rendered the public sphere empty, reticent, and depoliticized’ (Aerts 2010: 224). There were still many associations but they ‘steered clear of politics’ and the press ‘generally chose to avoid controversial issues’ (Aerts 2010: 224). Van Zanten uses the term ‘repressive nationalism’ to describe how public politics and political debate in 1814 were actively stigmatised by William I and the elite as *unDutch* – in newspapers, poems, songs and books.⁶ This effort contributed to stimulating loyalism and monarchism. In a similar way, Charles John and the Swedish elite, supported by pro-union agents in Norway, were actively framing the politics of the newly established Dual Kingdom as *Scandinavian* through pamphlets, poems and newspapers, as I will come back to later. In both Norway and Sweden political issues were, however, intensively debated in oppositional political journals and newspapers after 1814 (Edgren 2019: 305–

318). In both regions, even if the degree of urbanisation and literacy differed between the densely populated Netherlands and the more rural Scandinavian Peninsula, an emerging public sphere with a rising amount of political pamphlets, journals and newspapers contributed to a more critical debate. William I had the means to react through state supervision of public life, and persecution of critical publicists and lawyers. Charles XIV John did not have the same possibilities for controlling the critical press in Norway, but could more easily control the press in Sweden due to legal regulations (Björne 2018: 59–64).⁷

The United Kingdom of the Netherlands is commonly described as a Restoration state, under the rule of an enlightened but quite despotic king (Kossman 1978: 113–138). Recent historiographic interpretations underline, however, that although this was an authoritarian government, it was also a modernizing one, emphasizing development, prosperity and stability (Lok 2017: 42, van Zanten 2012, Blom and Lamberts 2006: 307–308). Stability, peace and independence of the North, were main arguments in Charles John's rhetoric regarding the establishment and maintenance of a common state construction in the Scandinavian Peninsula (Hemstad 2014: 302). Both the Dutch and Scandinavian unifications were the result of the efforts of two ambitious rulers with a common interest in securing and strengthening their newly formed kingdoms at a time of great transformations throughout Europe. One way of doing this was by means of a national integration policy.

Amalgamation

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, an amalgamation is, figuratively speaking, '[a] homogeneous union of what were previously distinct elements, societies, etc.' (OED, 2019). In the two cases under consideration, amalgamation as an 'action of combining distinct elements [...] into one uniform whole' (OED, 2019), may be seen as a state-patriotic project imposed from above, involving state institutions, aimed at developing a sense of common identity among the citizens. It was not a project primarily based on the idea of a nationally conscious and sovereign people, even if it was informed by, or at least had to relate to, the national thinking of the time.

In both the new states politics of amalgamation were employed, but the means available differed profoundly. In the United Kingdom of the Netherlands it was an official policy, supported by the Great Powers from the beginning. The London Protocol of 1814 established the basis for the union as 'un amalgame' or a union 'intime et complète' (Blom and Lamberts 2006: 306). On this foundation, the enlightened King could utilize his great constitutional power in his efforts to weld nation and state together in a nation-state and to stimulate 'a new nationalism common to the North and South on the basis of history and language' (Kossmann 1978: 111). Through a 'national prosperity policy', seeking to build political and economic unity, and through a strong cultural, religious and language policy, the aim was to 'blend the different parts of the new country together and aiming to create a buffer state both geographically and culturally' (Weijermars 2017: 151; Blom and Lamberts 2006: 309-311). Semi-official nationwide associations, such as the Society for Public Welfare (Maatschappij tot Nut van 't Algemeen) – the first voluntary association to become a long-lasting national institution – were involved in the process (Aerts 2010: 222). Dutch was declared the 'national language', and the language resolutions in the period 1819 to 1823 attempted to establish Dutch as the language of education, administration and law in most of the state, even in parts of the French-speaking South. Through a centralized education policy a range of primary schools were built in the South, secondary education in the Southern provinces was controlled in different ways and teachers' education was regulated and expanded. Three new universities were also established in the South. The education policy challenged the strong position of the Roman Catholic Church in the South.

Leerssen points to the role of education in the dissemination of the cultivated national culture to give a 'sense of collective national identity' through the teaching of vernacular language, national history and national literature (Leerssen 2005: 27). The imposition of Dutch language, history and literature, however, failed to function as a means of unification throughout the realm, but provoked antagonism and triggered national reactions. Historians now claim that the period between 1820 and 1827 is the highlight of the united Netherlands and William I's unification policy (Kossmann 1978; Dunthorne and Wintle

2012; Blom and Lamberts 2006). By the late 1820s the amalgamation policy was met with growing resistance and opposition from the predominantly Catholic Southern Netherlands, protesting against the language coercion and Protestant domination. Opposition to William I's authoritarian style was widespread, also resulting in demands for freedom of the press and freedom of education. The strong opposition led to political division. An independent Belgium was established on 20 December 1830.

The attempts to 'dutchify' Belgium through language coercion did not have any parallel in the Scandinavian dual monarchy. The power of the king to pursue such measures was clearly more restricted and the structure of the state was different. There were never attempts to 'swedify' Norwegian culture, education or language. As in the Dutch case, with a transnational Netherlandic language area - Dutch in the Northern and Flemish in parts of the Southern Netherlands, in addition to French - there were two main language areas in the Scandinavian region. Due to the political history, Danish constituted a common language area in Denmark and Norway, while Swedish was used in Sweden and parts of Finland. The two main languages were, although quite different, mutually comprehensible. The vernacular cultures were similar but often perceived as quite different. Unlike the Dutch dual religious situation, with the Dutch Reformed Church dominant in the North and the Roman Catholic Church in the South, the Lutheran State Church was dominant, but divided according to national boundaries in the Scandinavian region. The school systems within the union - in common with most social, cultural and political institutions - were nationally separated and completely independent of each other.

The term 'amalgamation' was nevertheless eagerly used as a warning note in Norway against almost any Swedish attempt at unifying the two parts of the common state. The Norwegians, both the opposition but usually also the government, were determined to secure the national autonomy prescribed in the constitution, especially in this early phase. A first mention of this concept is found as early as 1813, in a pamphlet by a Danish author published in Britain as a response to the Swedish propaganda campaign (Hemstad 2014: 50-52; Hemstad 2015: 110-111). From 1814 onwards it was frequently used in the Norwegian

press, especially among the opposition, as a term of abuse against Swedish initiatives that could be interpreted as attempts to strengthen the union. Even though the power of Charles XIV John as King of Norway was limited by the constitution, efforts to challenge the authority of the parliament and to change the constitution were put forward in the 1820s and 1830s, though without success. The Norwegian insistence on recognition and equality within the union, strengthened by the fear of being subordinated as the junior partner, played out on the public sphere in seemingly symbolic matters, such as questions of naming, mapping and cultivation of culture.

Naming, Mapping and Culture

Complex political entities, such as united kingdoms, must be represented in some way or other as a composite unit rather than fragmented parts. Their representations – be it through maps, names or national symbols, such as flags, coat of arms, anthems and national days – have a potential power through their symbolic and emotional dimensions, as part of the official imagery of the state. Naming and mapping can thus be very effective tools when used by state institutions, in creating national identities and imagined communities (Anderson 1991).

Seen from a state-building perspective, new narratives and symbols of Netherlandic and Norwegian-Swedish unification and uniformity were urgently needed after 1814. These could be disseminated through the creation of new images of the common area. One of the necessary measures which could contribute to the required revision of established mental maps in both regions was to find a proper name for the newly created unified kingdoms. In the Netherlands this was not perceived as a main problem, it seems. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands could function as a unifying name, uniting the Northern and the Southern Netherlands, facilitating the process of amalgamation in this sense, at least. The name was based on common historical usages, although the common state history of this region was rather limited – a short period in the sixteenth century (1548–1580) and later under French revolutionary rule, named as the Batavian Republic

(1795–1801), referring to an ancient German tribe. The inhabitants in the region were still all named a ‘Nederlander’, in French termed ‘un Belge’ (but also ‘Hollandais’ or ‘Neerlandais’), probably after the old Latin names of the area. However, these kinds of naming to mark identity did not have, Lok argues, their ‘more or less fixed meaning as they have now’ (Lok 2017: 37).

Revised maps of the Low Countries had to be produced after 1815, reflecting the new borders and name, and William I therefore had to engage cartographers in his state building project. Different maps from the period have the title *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, thus interestingly omitting ‘Verenigd’ in the title.

The attempt to label and name the new political entities was applied to both nouns and adjectives, and functioned in both cases as an important strategy of discursive nationalization. Adjectives, Beyen emphasises, ‘apply a common denominator to phenomena whose diversity is recognized; substantival labelling, on the contrary, tends to do away with these differences’ (Beyen 2013: 69, 76). The label ‘Dutch’ is not easy to define in this period (Rutten and Kalmthout 2018: 19). It was often used to refer to the language and culture of the Northern Netherlands, the former Dutch Republic, but could also refer to the entire language area, including the Southern parts. The use of this adjective could therefore reflect William I’s efforts to favor Dutch language, a central part of his amalgamation policy.

The adjectivation and substantivation of the Scandinavian region differed from the Dutch case. Here a new term was introduced as part of a discourse of unity utilized by Sweden as an amalgamation strategy. The name was also used by some Norwegians, while others reacted strongly against it. The official name of the new union on the Scandinavian Peninsula was The United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden. The usual short version was simply Norway and Sweden – or Sweden and Norway, dependent on point of view. In addition to this dual name, there were conscious efforts, stimulated by Swedish authorities, to promote ‘Scandinavia’ as a shared name, a common denominator. The geographical term The Scandinavian Peninsula, and Scandinavia (originally Latin and derived from Scania in the south-eastern part of Sweden), were in fact re-introduced as geopolitical concepts in Sweden

in 1812. Charles John argued, based on geopolitical logic, that the Scandinavian Peninsula constituted a so-called natural entity, as if 'nature itself', as he termed it, had defined the borders of the union (Hemstad 2015: 110).

In accordance with this strategy and as part of a patriotic pedagogy, in a range of textbooks in geography and other schoolbooks in political science and history in Sweden, 'Scandinavia' was defined as Sweden and Norway exclusively. This reflected a broader use of this terminology in Sweden, which firmly excluded Finland and Denmark from the region. 'Scandinavia' understood in this narrow sense was extensively used in the public sphere in Sweden – in political speeches and pamphlets, historical overviews and published statistics, poetry and encyclopedias as well in the titles of newspapers and journals (Hemstad 2018: 114–132). This was part of strengthening and legitimising the union: the inhabitants of the dual monarchy were 'Scandinavians' in addition to being Norwegians or Swedes. It should however be pointed out that this usage never went far beyond the Swedish borders.

The new Swedish geopolitical terminology was repeatedly discussed in the public sphere in Norway, and protests were raised against the use of a 'false concept' and concealed 'amalgamation' (Roosen 1833). It was frequently underlined that the Norwegians did not want to become 'Scandinavians'. Yet again, textbooks demonstrate how new concepts and narratives of the state were disseminated to the upcoming generations. By including Denmark in the definition of Scandinavia, Norwegian educational and other published materials told a slightly different story compared to that in their Swedish counterparts. Not surprisingly, what was taught to the children about the union in relation to its geography, history and society also varied between Norway and Sweden – while the unity was underlined in a Swedish context, the national separation was emphasized in Norwegian textbooks (Hemstad 2018: 121).

In addition to textbooks, state-initiated maps also played an important role in disseminating the narrative of a unified Scandinavian Peninsula – often simply renamed as 'Scandinavia'. One of these common maps was the result of a long-standing cartographic project commissioned by Swedish authorities. The title was *Sweden and*

Norway or Scandinavia. The name of the completed map in 8 parts referred to the historical usage: 'Map of the Southern part of Sweden and Norway or the former, so-called Scandinavia' (*Karta* 1815–1826). Similar maps of Scandinavia were also used in Swedish textbooks. This labelling of maps and naming of the area as Scandinavia was not only a cartographical and geographical notion; rather it represented a political message. Like other Swedish initiatives more or less promoting amalgamation, these maps were therefore criticized by nationally-minded Norwegians. Other Swedish maps from this period varied in the use of titles but, at least seen from a Norwegian perspective, found other ways of pushing the country's amalgamation strategy. One of those, Hagelstam's map of 'Sweden and Norway' from 1820, used both names but was criticized due to the blurred boundary line between the two kingdoms (Hagelstam 1820–1821). Maps may communicate a message directly to the eyes, without further explanations, a Norwegian politician underlined in 1833, as part of a renewed national conflict over maps of the area, thereby emphasizing the importance of maps as symbolic images (Hemstad 2018: 114–132). In Norway, maps of the Scandinavian Peninsula were also produced from the late 1830s on. In these the title was, however, never 'Scandinavia', only 'Norway and Sweden'.

There were state-based attempts to cultivate a common national culture in both regions as well, most profoundly in the Netherlands. Here a national anthem was introduced in 1816, with French lyrics added only in 1824. In the Scandinavian union, national anthems were introduced on a national basis in each of the two countries. Family metaphors, frequent in Netherlandic national representation, with the king as the common father, were seldom used in Norway or Sweden, even if they had been commonly used in the Danish-Norwegian dual monarchy before 1814. This was later replaced with metaphors of kinship – with the three Scandinavian peoples portrayed as brothers in the context of the pan-Scandinavian movement from the mid-nineteenth century, although they were seldom used with reference to the union state as such.

In stimulating a common 'mnemonic community' that commemorates a shared national past, the myth of Waterloo played an important role

in a united Netherlandic context (Leerssen 2013: 115; van Zanten 2015: 114–224; Weijmars 2017: 149–162). The importance of this myth from a very recent past reflected the absence of a common past as a point of reference in both recent and older history of the region (Lok 2017: 41–42). North and South Netherlands fought together at Waterloo, an experience soon to be exploited as a national mythology underpinning the new kingdom. From the early 1820s, there were regular commemorations of Waterloo and monuments commemorating the battlefield were raised. There was also an increasing amount of literature on Waterloo, ranging from poems, cantatas and prose texts to fictionalized testimonies, such as letters and diaries. Some of these texts were the result of state-initiated literary competitions. In her studies of Dutch Waterloo literature, Weijmars finds interesting differences between Northern and Southern Waterloo narratives, particularly in relation to depictions of the battle itself (Weijmars 2017: 155). There are also, however, examples of books and poems after 1815 celebrating the combined efforts of both parts.

When looking for a Scandinavian parallel to the Dutch Waterloo literature and commemoration, the closest possibility is the literature on and commemoration of 1814. An obvious complication is that 1814 was mostly celebrated for different reasons: in Sweden 1814 marked the end of the war on the continent resulting in the union with Norway, whereas in Norway, on the other hand, 1814 stood for the war for freedom from Swedish aggression, which resulted in the Norwegian Constitution and, during the autumn and after the short war in the border region, the acceptance of the Constitution within the framework of the union. There was therefore both a Norwegian 1814 literature and a Swedish 1814 literature, emphasizing different aspects and parts of the history. An attempt at a common commemoration of 1814 was the state-endorsed official celebration of 4 November, the day the union between Norway and Sweden was concluded. This imposed tradition never took root in Norway, where the main day of celebration remained 17 May, when the Norwegian Constitution was signed and Christian Frederik elected as King of Norway. Charles John even tried to forbid the celebration of 17 May, and prescribed 4 November as a common

day to celebrate. The banning of the celebration, which did not last for long, did much to increase its symbolical meaning.

Conclusion: Amalgamation and Culture

In transnational relations one may speak of different kinds of relations depending on the power structure between the partners: ‘asymmetric reciprocity’ refers to connections where one part is dominant but still dependent on the other part; ‘mutual complementarity’, on the other hand, is used for partnerships between independent, relatively equal parts (Fossat, Magnussen, Petersen and Sørensen 2009: 19; Kjeldstadli 2013: 15–29). I find this approach instructive also when dealing with transnational relations within a dual state construction. The sort of relations established influences the dynamic between the two parts, including how each part responds to different measures implemented within the union, not just within the governmental system but also more broadly in the public sphere. Norway’s relation to both Sweden and Denmark and the Southern Netherlands’ relation to the Northern part could both be classified as examples of ‘asymmetric reciprocity’.

The United Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden were established at almost the same time. The first of these reorganized state structures turned out to be more short-lived than the second, in spite of – or rather even due to – King William I’s efforts to create a single nation within his extended kingdom by means of amalgamation. Charles XIV John attempted to follow a similar strategy but he did not have the means to implement it, due to the looser character of the Scandinavian union. The Swedish efforts of strengthen the union through a soft amalgamation after 1814 led to Norwegian counter-efforts. The Norwegian process of national identification is fundamentally formed by this experience, which also explains Norway’s reluctant attitude towards the later pan-Scandinavian movement and its political aspirations. In the Netherlands, the Southern part reacted more cautiously to attempts at amalgamation, although with a different background than in Norway. In both cases, the question of the cultivation of national culture played an important role in triggering national reactions against amalgamation policy from the

dominant partner. On the Scandinavian Peninsula, there was a general recognition of the different national cultures within the loose union – hence the weakness of the union made this union more resilient. When the union between Norway and Sweden finally broke up in 1905, national symbolism was partially responsible.

The Dutch and Scandinavian union states ended up as roads not taken – or at least not for very long – and maybe that is understandable, due to the different cultural, historical and national traditions. The union-based or greater Scandinavian/Dutch context is nevertheless a part of the common history of today's states and of the history of the macroregions and should therefore not be neglected. The two cases studied confirm Jackson's hypothesis that the acknowledgement of different national identities and sentiments is of major importance for the success and longevity of united kingdoms. The place of unionistic nationalism and cultivation of culture, and the complex role of loyalism and monarchism within these – and other – united kingdoms remain issues deserving of further examination.

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Endnotes

¹ This article is based on studies of a wide array of source material from Norway and Sweden, discussed in various publications by the author. The part regarding Dutch history is based on secondary literature, published in English or German. A further comparison would require use of primary material from both regions. I would like to thank Jeroen van Zanten and Matthijs Lok for valuable comments and suggestions. A mobility grant from ReNEW (Reimagining Norden in an Evolving World) enabled a stimulating period as guest researcher at the University of Amsterdam in 2018.

² Among Dutch-Danish studies are K. Fabricius, L.L. Hammerich and V. Lorenzen (1945). *Holland – Denmark. Forbindelserne mellem de to lande gennem tiderne, I-II*. Copenhagen, D. Grit (1984). ‘Bilderrijk en Denemarken’, *De Nieuwe Taalgids*, 77, M. Meyboom (1896). ‘Het Nederlandsch in Denemarken’, *Neerlandia* 1., G. v.d. Putte (1976). ‘Kulturele betrekkingen tussen de Nederlanden en Denemarken, I en II’, in: *Ons Erfdeel*. Jeroen van Zanten is currently working on a comparison between the Netherlands and small nations like Denmark and Piedmont in the early nineteenth century for *Oxford Handbook on the long 19th Century* (forthcoming, 2020/21). Matthijs Lok and Michael Bregnsbo are likewise comparing the Netherlands and Denmark in the 19th century in a forthcoming article.

³ For further reading, see: Hemstad, R., Møller, J.F. and Thorkildsen, D. (eds.) (2018), *Skandinavismen. Vision og virkning*. Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, Hemstad, R. ‘Scandinavianism. Mapping the Rise of a New Concept’, *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, 13(1), pp. 1–21, Hemstad, R. (2010), ‘Scandinavianism, Nordic Co-operation and ‘Nordic Democracy’’, in Kurunmäki, J. and Strang, J. (eds.), *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, pp. 179–193, Tim van Gerven, ‘Scandinavianism.

Overlapping and Competing Identities in the Nordic World 1770-1919', PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2020.

⁴ Luxembourg was also part of the German Federation. See Pit Péporté, Sonja Kmec, Benoît Majerus and Michel Margue (2010), *Inventing Luxembourg. Representations of the Past, Space and Language from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century*. Leiden, Boston: Brill.

⁵ An amount of totally 500 publications, including translations and editions, are identified as part of the Scandinavian based propaganda war on Norway 1812–1814. See Hemstad, R. (ed.) (2014). *'Like a Herd of Cattle'. Parliamentary and Public Debates Regarding the Cession of Norway, 1813–1814*, Oslo: Akademisk Publisering, and Hemstad, R. (2014), *Propagandakrig. Kampen om Norge i Norden og Europa, 1812–1814*. Oslo: Novus.

⁶ Jeroen van Zanten (2004), *'Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard'. Politieke discussie en oppositievorming in Nederland 1813–1840*. Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek.

⁷ See also Björne's contribution in this issue.

⁸ See also Lok, M. (2009). *Windvanen: Napoleontische bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse Restauratie (1813–1820)*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.

⁹ Oxford English Dictionary online, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/5979?redirectedFrom=amalgamation&>, (accessed 10 Oct. 2019).

¹⁰ On the role of associational culture in union states, see Alvin Jackson's contribution in this issue.

¹¹ *Het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*.

¹² In his book, *Geografie för begynnare*, Daniel Djurberg termed the Low Countries after the unification in 1815 'Kingdom of Belgium' ('Konungariket Belgien') (!), referring to the Latin *Belgium Foederatum* (The United Netherland) and *Belgium Catholicum* (The Austrian Netherland), but adding that the country also was termed United Netherland ('Förenta Nederland'). Djurberg was, however, known for sometimes being quite creative in his naming, and Norwegians heavily criticized him for using 'Sweden' as just another name for 'Scandinavia' in this introductory book (see also below). (Djurberg 1815: 121–123, Hemstad 2018, 114–132).

¹³ *De förenade Konungarikena Sverige och Norge/De forenede Kongeriger Norge og Sverige*.

¹⁴ For further reading on Belgian orangism, supportive of reestablishing the United Kingdom under the Dutch royal family after 1830, see: Witte, E. (2014). *Het verloren koninkrijk. Het harde verzet van de Belgische orangisten tegen de revolutie 1828–1850*. Anvers-Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.

¹⁵ On the battle on 17 May 1829 in Christiania, that soon came to play an important role as a history of national resistance, see Nilsson 2018.

¹⁶ See Jackson's contribution in this issue.